US Intel report describes how the Muslim Brotherhood began controlling western media
The following Department of Defense Intelligence Report discusses Muslim Brotherhood events in Syria that took place in the 1960's, 70's and 80's, and describes how the Muslim Brotherhood's world-wide Propaganda Network began -- a Network that continues to distribute lies and propaganda to western media, and the world.
|
In 1982, when this Intel report was written, Muslim Brotherhood in Paris, Bonn, Brussels, Vienna, and even Hong Kong, began spreading anti-government propaganda against Syria. It was also the beginning of Iraqi involvement in pro-Muslim Brotherhood activities inside Syria. The report discusses the "Hama massacre" in which the Muslim Brotherhood claimed there was an attack conducted by the government and that 20,000 were massacred by the government -- untrue propaganda. Yet this propaganda is still used to this day to demonize the government. |
|
The 1980's were the starting point of false cries of "human rights violations" and propaganda reports of "government repression". But the only "repression" that was taking place was oppressing the terrorist activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Please note: The mention of 'President Assad' in this Intel report is NOT the current president of Syria. This document speaks of Hafez Assad who was president from 1971-2000.
Key excerpts from the Intelligence report:
In 1979, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Muslim Islamic fundamentalist organization, began a concerted effort to oust President [Hafez] Assad. Although the Brotherhood attempt of 1979-80 was successfully thwarted by Assad, a new venture began to be planned in 1980 and by early 1982 the Hama rebellion broke out. While the Brotherhood suffered a second military defeat, the Hama episode reflected a new sophistication in Muslim Brotherhood planning and operations. (preface:pg.iii)
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood began to develop into an opposition party [in 1963]. Brotherhood opposition intensified after the 23 February 1966 seizure of power by Alawite elements of the Baath Party, a group the Brotherhood does not consider to be Muslim. Their fears concerning the secularist path of the Baathists were confirmed when the Assad government adopted a new constitution in March 1973, which deleted any reference to Islam as the religion of the state. (summary:vii)
In early 1979, encouraged by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood developed a plan to trigger a similar popular revolution in Syria to oust Assad. The massacre of 50 Alawite cadets on 16 June 1979 at the Artillery School in Aleppo, signaled the start of the Muslim Brotherhood offensive. (summary:vii)
By early 1981, the new exiled Muslim Brotherhood leadership had developed a complex strategy to overthrow the Assad government built on a Brotherhood-led countrywide rebellion, which would apparently be linked to an anti-Assad Alawite coup. In early 1982, however, Syrian security uncovered the plot. (summary:vii)
As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood felt pressured into initiating the uprising in Hama, which began on 2 February 1982. (summary:vii)
From the "Discussion" section of the report:
... In February 1964, riots instigated by the Brotherhood against the Baath rule erupted, and by April the fundamentalist stronghold at Hama was in full rebellion. In the face of spreading disorder, Syrian strong man Amin Hafez [president at the time] sealed off Hama and moved army units into the city to crush the Muslim Brotherhood-led rebellion. Subsequently, Baath security activities against the Brotherhood intensified, driving many of its leaders into exile in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Gulf States. (discussion:1)
... As a result of internal Baath party rivalries, the military wing of the party, whose leadership included General Hafez Assad [who later became president], seized power [of the military] on 23 February 1966. (discussion:1)
The coup not only forced Amin Hafez, a Sunni Muslim, from power but signaled an end to Sunni Muslim domination of the Syrian Baath Party. The new leadership represented the Alawites, a secretive religious community comprising about 11 percent of the Syrian population. (discussion:1)
The rise to power of the Alawite faction of the Baath spurred the Muslim Brotherhood to intensify their covert efforts to ouster them from power since they did not believe that Alawites were Muslim. In March 1973, the Assad government introduced a new constitution for Syria, which deleted any reference to Islam as the religion of the state. This action was seen by the Brotherhood as further evidence that not only were the Alawites secularist, they were also anti-Islam. (discussion:1)
Although Muslim Brotherhood opposition was limited, they began to expand their covert arm for political violence, the Secret Apparatus, in about 1964, following Amin Hafez’s suppression of their activities. This covert arm … was known as The Youth of Mohammad, Soldiers of Allah, Faithful Youth, Islamic Vanguard, and a number of other noms de guerre. (discussion:1)
However, it was not until 1979 that the Muslim Brotherhood felt they had the strength and the political support to challenge the ruling Alawite-Baathist regime. (discussion:1)
The massacre of 50 Alawite cadets on 16 June 1979, at the artillery school in Aleppo, was apparently designed to signal the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood offensive to create a popular uprising similar to that in Iran. (discussion:1)
A New Leadership (pages 2-8)
The major setback in 1980 [of the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion] led to the removal of Issam Attar as Supreme Guide of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood … The new leadership consisted of Adman Said al Din as the new Supreme Guide … and Adnan Uqlah, Commander of the Secret Apparatus.
Adnan Said al Din had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood since 1943 and had acquired considerable experience with the militant Secret Apparatus. His deputy, Said Hawi, had served as an assistant to Shaykh Marwan Haddad, Commander of the Secret Apparatus from 1965 until his death. Hawi went into exile in Jordan until 1980 when he appears to have moved to Europe.
Ali Sadr al Din Bayluni, is the number three man in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood chain of command, a 45-yr old lawyer who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1943. He, like Din and Hawi, was convinced that armed struggle was the only course which should be followed by the Brotherhood.
The fourth man who made up the senior leadership was Adnan Uqlah, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood military commander, who directed and controlled operations in Syria.
In 1980, Syrian President Hafez Assad was successful in disrupting Muslim Brotherhood activities. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s basic organizational structure remained intact. This included an estimated 10,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood and an additional 1000 members of the Secret Apparatus [note: who resided in Hama, where the Hama uprising would occur].
The first priority for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership was to regroup its Syrian organization for a new round of fighting.
In December 1980 … Said Hawi and Ali Sadr al Din Bayluni announced the formation of an Islamic Front. The announcement … also signaled the beginning of increased contacts between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi Government. Although the Iraqi Government was secularist, it was Sunni Muslim and diametrically opposed to the leadership of Hafez Assad in Syria. During the 1979-80 fighting, Iraq had provided covert support to the Brotherhood.
The plan, developed by the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and probably coordinated with Iraq, centered on two complementary actions. The first was a full scale revolt by the city of Hama, a traditional Brotherhood stronghold and the location of its covert headquarters in Syria. Once this rebellion was unleashed, similar uprisings were to take place in Aleppo, Damascus, and other major cities, accompanied by a general strike designed to paralyze Syria.
Simultaneously, a sophisticated worldwide propaganda campaign was to be launched supporting the rebellion and emphasizing its victories and wholesale desertion of Army units to the rebel side. Press releases were to be made in Europe and the US, and propaganda broadcasts against Syria were to be carried by the Phalange-controlled "Voice of Lebanon" and the Iraqi-controlled "Voice of Arab Syria".
Iraq began its preliminary effort in early 1981 through it publication, "al-Minbar", which discussed human rights violations in Syria under the Assad Regime [the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood]. The Baghdad-based "Voice of Arab Syria" aired "al-Minbar" articles and focused on themes of Assad repression.
By about July 1981, the Muslim Brotherhood was preparing to infiltrate members of its elite Secret Apparatus, who had fled Syria. At least 100 militants were transported from Jordan into Iraq where they probably received training prior to their movement into Syria. In late September or early October the Muslim Brotherhood, in anticipation of the buildup of the Secret Apparatus in Hama, attacked a government office in Hama and seized several hundred blank identification cards to be used by the Secret Apparatus.
Sometime after this, the infiltration of Secret Apparatus militants began forming staging areas in Iraq, and to a lesser degree from Turkey. During the interim period, a number of terrorist bombings and shootings took place [in Syria].
Despite the meticulous planning, however, Syrian security discovered the dissidence.
In the Syrian-Jordanian border city of Dara, house-to-house search efforts were initiated as security measures were strengthened throughout Syria. By late January 1982, there were indications that the Government intended to conduct house-to-house searches in Hama, which undoubtedly would have uncovered caches, and discovered at least some of the 200 Brotherhood militants who had been infiltrated into the city.
As a result of Syrian security action, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to prematurely unleash the Hama rebellion with the hope that it might spark widespread fighting in other cities. If a general strike had been created, and the propaganda barrage directed against Syria from Iraq and Lebanon was effective, wide scale desertions might have been triggered within the Syrian Armed Forces. The possibility existed, therefore, the Assad Regime might have been forced from power.
Even if the plan was not successful, the Hama rebellion could become a symbolic rallying point for future anti-government activities. The Brotherhood leadership believed this would, in turn, cause greater alienation of the Assad government from the Sunni Muslim majority.
During late January or early February 1982, the top three leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood… left their clandestine headquarters in Brussels, to dispersed locations where they could direct the operations in Syria. On 2 February, following a clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and Syrian security forces, the loudspeakers atop the mosque minarets in Hama called on the people to begin a Jihad. The appeal also told the people that arms were available at specified mosques. At about the same time, teams of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus, some in army uniforms [stolen], moved to attack pre-selected government targets in the city.
One of the teams [of the Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus] attacked the Office of Civil Registry … other elements attacked police stations, security offices, Baath Party Headquarters, and army units, forcing them [security forces] to withdraw from the city.
Muslim Brotherhood forces moved to the outskirts of Hama to block any attempts by government forces to re-enter the city. Although the Secret Apparatus [in Hama] numbered only about 400 when fighting broke out on 2 February, its ranks had probably grown to almost 1000 by 5 February through the addition of regular Muslim Brotherhood members [Hama was the Muslim Brotherhood's stronghold].
On 9 February the leadership of the Islamic Revolution in Syria, a nom de guerre for the Muslim Brotherhood, reported about the fighting in Hama over the Iraqi-controlled "Voice of Arab Syria". The news commentary described the rebel [Muslim Brotherhood] seizure of the city and the execution of some 50 “spies and informers.” They also stated that major elements of the 47th Army Brigade sent to recapture Hama had defected and joined the people of Hama, and that Syrian Air Force pilots refused to carry out orders to bomb the city [note: this was propaganda and untrue, spread purposefully via "Voice of Arab Syria"]. The news bulletin pointed out that mutinies against the government had spread to units at Latakiyah and the air base at Palmyra, and new clashes were erupting in Aleppo. About 3,000 government forces had been killed or wounded, according to the communique.
As this Brotherhood propaganda campaign intensified, a Muslim Brotherhood spokesman in Bonn, Germany, on 10 February, reaffirmed [the propaganda statements] that Hama had been liberated and that the government attempts to retake the city had failed. The Bonn announcement confirmed that government losses numbered about 3,000 killed and wounded and that there had been major defection from the Syrian 47th Armored Brigade.
On 11 February a source in Hong Kong reported that the government radio station in Aleppo had been captured, and a Paris announcement attributed to a Brotherhood spokesman in Bonn, noted that 3,000-4,000 government forces from armor and air defense units had joined the Islamic Revolution in Hama. On the same date, Muslim Brotherhood sources in Vienna claimed 2,000 government forces had been killed and another 3,000 wounded, noting that that fighting had spread to Damascus, Latakiyah, Aleppo, and the eastern part of the country [note: this was all untrue propaganda, purposefully spread by Brotherhood in Bonn, Hong Kong, Paris and Vienna].
On 14 February as the propaganda offensive continued: Brotherhood sources in Ankara reported that large portions of the Damascus-Hama-Aleppo Highway were under the control of the Islamic Revolution. On 15 February, the Phalange-controlled "Voice of Lebanon" reported the resistance in Hama continuing as a general strike took hold in Homs, Latakiyah, and Aleppo. On 15 February, the "Voice of Lebanon" announced that 5,000 Syrian soldiers had deserted and fled to Lebanon.
By this time Syrian forces had retaken much of the city of Hama, although isolated pockets of Muslim Brotherhood militants remained in the old portion of the city. [note: the 'rebellion' had only taken place in Hama, and not Homs, Latakiyah, Aleppo or elsewhere as the Muslim Brotherhood propaganda had stated].
On 16 February, Said Hawi, the Controller General of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, in an appeal aired over Baghdad’s "Voice of Arab Syria", called for a nationwide uprising: “The Jihad in confronting the tyrant is now a duty of all those capable of carrying arms”.
The propaganda continued on 20 February when the Baghdad "Voice of Arab Syria" urged the people of Syria to unify against the regime of Hafez Assad and stated that the religious leadership of Syria (the Muslim Brotherhood) has issued a fatwa (Islamic legal decision) which forbade any true Muslim from paying taxes to the government.
On 25 February, a Brotherhood press release picked up by the Christian Science Monitor stated that a Syrian naval base near Latakiyah had been seized and two submarines captured, claiming the Islamic Front controlled the coastline from the Latakiyah north to the Turkish border. Despite the propaganda reporting, the uprising in Syria had never spread outside of Hama, although some limited [terrorist] bombings had taken place in Damascus.
The total casualties for the Hama incident probably number about 2,000. This includes an estimated 300-400 members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s elite Secret Apparatus or about one third of their total Secret Apparatus strength in Syria. The Syrian Government defeated the fundamentalist and it will probably be several years before the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to directly challenge the government again. ...[but] the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated a new sophistication in its ability to use propaganda and garner support.
Hafez Assad’s strategy continues to be based on the realization that most Syrians, regardless of their differences, do not want the Muslim Brotherhood in power. Furthermore, the Syrians are pragmatic and realize that Assad has given Syria greater stability during his rule than it has had at any other time since achieving independence in 1946.
In a 7 March 1982 speech, President Hafez Assad accused the Muslim Brotherhood of distorting Islam, killing in the name of Islam, and “posing” as Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian President said, was nothing more than criminals who “desecrated mosques” by transforming them into arms warehouses. These criminals “butchered children, women, and old people in the name of Islam.”
The Muslim Brotherhood is determined to continue its armed struggle against the government of Syria. Iraq also appears equally willing to support [anti-government] activities and will probably continue to act as the middleman for the Muslim Brotherhood ... The Syrian dissidents' modus operandi will continue to be terrorism, particularly bombings and assassinations.
~~~~
For full Intel document online:
https://syria360.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/dia-syria-muslimbrotherhoodpressureintensifies-2.pdf
Please note: The mention of 'President Assad' in this Intel report is NOT the current president of Syria. This document speaks of Hafez Assad who was president from 1971-2000.
Key excerpts from the Intelligence report:
In 1979, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Muslim Islamic fundamentalist organization, began a concerted effort to oust President [Hafez] Assad. Although the Brotherhood attempt of 1979-80 was successfully thwarted by Assad, a new venture began to be planned in 1980 and by early 1982 the Hama rebellion broke out. While the Brotherhood suffered a second military defeat, the Hama episode reflected a new sophistication in Muslim Brotherhood planning and operations. (preface:pg.iii)
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood began to develop into an opposition party [in 1963]. Brotherhood opposition intensified after the 23 February 1966 seizure of power by Alawite elements of the Baath Party, a group the Brotherhood does not consider to be Muslim. Their fears concerning the secularist path of the Baathists were confirmed when the Assad government adopted a new constitution in March 1973, which deleted any reference to Islam as the religion of the state. (summary:vii)
In early 1979, encouraged by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood developed a plan to trigger a similar popular revolution in Syria to oust Assad. The massacre of 50 Alawite cadets on 16 June 1979 at the Artillery School in Aleppo, signaled the start of the Muslim Brotherhood offensive. (summary:vii)
By early 1981, the new exiled Muslim Brotherhood leadership had developed a complex strategy to overthrow the Assad government built on a Brotherhood-led countrywide rebellion, which would apparently be linked to an anti-Assad Alawite coup. In early 1982, however, Syrian security uncovered the plot. (summary:vii)
As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood felt pressured into initiating the uprising in Hama, which began on 2 February 1982. (summary:vii)
From the "Discussion" section of the report:
... In February 1964, riots instigated by the Brotherhood against the Baath rule erupted, and by April the fundamentalist stronghold at Hama was in full rebellion. In the face of spreading disorder, Syrian strong man Amin Hafez [president at the time] sealed off Hama and moved army units into the city to crush the Muslim Brotherhood-led rebellion. Subsequently, Baath security activities against the Brotherhood intensified, driving many of its leaders into exile in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Gulf States. (discussion:1)
... As a result of internal Baath party rivalries, the military wing of the party, whose leadership included General Hafez Assad [who later became president], seized power [of the military] on 23 February 1966. (discussion:1)
The coup not only forced Amin Hafez, a Sunni Muslim, from power but signaled an end to Sunni Muslim domination of the Syrian Baath Party. The new leadership represented the Alawites, a secretive religious community comprising about 11 percent of the Syrian population. (discussion:1)
The rise to power of the Alawite faction of the Baath spurred the Muslim Brotherhood to intensify their covert efforts to ouster them from power since they did not believe that Alawites were Muslim. In March 1973, the Assad government introduced a new constitution for Syria, which deleted any reference to Islam as the religion of the state. This action was seen by the Brotherhood as further evidence that not only were the Alawites secularist, they were also anti-Islam. (discussion:1)
Although Muslim Brotherhood opposition was limited, they began to expand their covert arm for political violence, the Secret Apparatus, in about 1964, following Amin Hafez’s suppression of their activities. This covert arm … was known as The Youth of Mohammad, Soldiers of Allah, Faithful Youth, Islamic Vanguard, and a number of other noms de guerre. (discussion:1)
However, it was not until 1979 that the Muslim Brotherhood felt they had the strength and the political support to challenge the ruling Alawite-Baathist regime. (discussion:1)
The massacre of 50 Alawite cadets on 16 June 1979, at the artillery school in Aleppo, was apparently designed to signal the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood offensive to create a popular uprising similar to that in Iran. (discussion:1)
A New Leadership (pages 2-8)
The major setback in 1980 [of the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion] led to the removal of Issam Attar as Supreme Guide of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood … The new leadership consisted of Adman Said al Din as the new Supreme Guide … and Adnan Uqlah, Commander of the Secret Apparatus.
Adnan Said al Din had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood since 1943 and had acquired considerable experience with the militant Secret Apparatus. His deputy, Said Hawi, had served as an assistant to Shaykh Marwan Haddad, Commander of the Secret Apparatus from 1965 until his death. Hawi went into exile in Jordan until 1980 when he appears to have moved to Europe.
Ali Sadr al Din Bayluni, is the number three man in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood chain of command, a 45-yr old lawyer who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1943. He, like Din and Hawi, was convinced that armed struggle was the only course which should be followed by the Brotherhood.
The fourth man who made up the senior leadership was Adnan Uqlah, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood military commander, who directed and controlled operations in Syria.
In 1980, Syrian President Hafez Assad was successful in disrupting Muslim Brotherhood activities. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s basic organizational structure remained intact. This included an estimated 10,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood and an additional 1000 members of the Secret Apparatus [note: who resided in Hama, where the Hama uprising would occur].
The first priority for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership was to regroup its Syrian organization for a new round of fighting.
In December 1980 … Said Hawi and Ali Sadr al Din Bayluni announced the formation of an Islamic Front. The announcement … also signaled the beginning of increased contacts between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi Government. Although the Iraqi Government was secularist, it was Sunni Muslim and diametrically opposed to the leadership of Hafez Assad in Syria. During the 1979-80 fighting, Iraq had provided covert support to the Brotherhood.
The plan, developed by the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and probably coordinated with Iraq, centered on two complementary actions. The first was a full scale revolt by the city of Hama, a traditional Brotherhood stronghold and the location of its covert headquarters in Syria. Once this rebellion was unleashed, similar uprisings were to take place in Aleppo, Damascus, and other major cities, accompanied by a general strike designed to paralyze Syria.
Simultaneously, a sophisticated worldwide propaganda campaign was to be launched supporting the rebellion and emphasizing its victories and wholesale desertion of Army units to the rebel side. Press releases were to be made in Europe and the US, and propaganda broadcasts against Syria were to be carried by the Phalange-controlled "Voice of Lebanon" and the Iraqi-controlled "Voice of Arab Syria".
Iraq began its preliminary effort in early 1981 through it publication, "al-Minbar", which discussed human rights violations in Syria under the Assad Regime [the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood]. The Baghdad-based "Voice of Arab Syria" aired "al-Minbar" articles and focused on themes of Assad repression.
By about July 1981, the Muslim Brotherhood was preparing to infiltrate members of its elite Secret Apparatus, who had fled Syria. At least 100 militants were transported from Jordan into Iraq where they probably received training prior to their movement into Syria. In late September or early October the Muslim Brotherhood, in anticipation of the buildup of the Secret Apparatus in Hama, attacked a government office in Hama and seized several hundred blank identification cards to be used by the Secret Apparatus.
Sometime after this, the infiltration of Secret Apparatus militants began forming staging areas in Iraq, and to a lesser degree from Turkey. During the interim period, a number of terrorist bombings and shootings took place [in Syria].
Despite the meticulous planning, however, Syrian security discovered the dissidence.
In the Syrian-Jordanian border city of Dara, house-to-house search efforts were initiated as security measures were strengthened throughout Syria. By late January 1982, there were indications that the Government intended to conduct house-to-house searches in Hama, which undoubtedly would have uncovered caches, and discovered at least some of the 200 Brotherhood militants who had been infiltrated into the city.
As a result of Syrian security action, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to prematurely unleash the Hama rebellion with the hope that it might spark widespread fighting in other cities. If a general strike had been created, and the propaganda barrage directed against Syria from Iraq and Lebanon was effective, wide scale desertions might have been triggered within the Syrian Armed Forces. The possibility existed, therefore, the Assad Regime might have been forced from power.
Even if the plan was not successful, the Hama rebellion could become a symbolic rallying point for future anti-government activities. The Brotherhood leadership believed this would, in turn, cause greater alienation of the Assad government from the Sunni Muslim majority.
During late January or early February 1982, the top three leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood… left their clandestine headquarters in Brussels, to dispersed locations where they could direct the operations in Syria. On 2 February, following a clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and Syrian security forces, the loudspeakers atop the mosque minarets in Hama called on the people to begin a Jihad. The appeal also told the people that arms were available at specified mosques. At about the same time, teams of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus, some in army uniforms [stolen], moved to attack pre-selected government targets in the city.
One of the teams [of the Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus] attacked the Office of Civil Registry … other elements attacked police stations, security offices, Baath Party Headquarters, and army units, forcing them [security forces] to withdraw from the city.
Muslim Brotherhood forces moved to the outskirts of Hama to block any attempts by government forces to re-enter the city. Although the Secret Apparatus [in Hama] numbered only about 400 when fighting broke out on 2 February, its ranks had probably grown to almost 1000 by 5 February through the addition of regular Muslim Brotherhood members [Hama was the Muslim Brotherhood's stronghold].
On 9 February the leadership of the Islamic Revolution in Syria, a nom de guerre for the Muslim Brotherhood, reported about the fighting in Hama over the Iraqi-controlled "Voice of Arab Syria". The news commentary described the rebel [Muslim Brotherhood] seizure of the city and the execution of some 50 “spies and informers.” They also stated that major elements of the 47th Army Brigade sent to recapture Hama had defected and joined the people of Hama, and that Syrian Air Force pilots refused to carry out orders to bomb the city [note: this was propaganda and untrue, spread purposefully via "Voice of Arab Syria"]. The news bulletin pointed out that mutinies against the government had spread to units at Latakiyah and the air base at Palmyra, and new clashes were erupting in Aleppo. About 3,000 government forces had been killed or wounded, according to the communique.
As this Brotherhood propaganda campaign intensified, a Muslim Brotherhood spokesman in Bonn, Germany, on 10 February, reaffirmed [the propaganda statements] that Hama had been liberated and that the government attempts to retake the city had failed. The Bonn announcement confirmed that government losses numbered about 3,000 killed and wounded and that there had been major defection from the Syrian 47th Armored Brigade.
On 11 February a source in Hong Kong reported that the government radio station in Aleppo had been captured, and a Paris announcement attributed to a Brotherhood spokesman in Bonn, noted that 3,000-4,000 government forces from armor and air defense units had joined the Islamic Revolution in Hama. On the same date, Muslim Brotherhood sources in Vienna claimed 2,000 government forces had been killed and another 3,000 wounded, noting that that fighting had spread to Damascus, Latakiyah, Aleppo, and the eastern part of the country [note: this was all untrue propaganda, purposefully spread by Brotherhood in Bonn, Hong Kong, Paris and Vienna].
On 14 February as the propaganda offensive continued: Brotherhood sources in Ankara reported that large portions of the Damascus-Hama-Aleppo Highway were under the control of the Islamic Revolution. On 15 February, the Phalange-controlled "Voice of Lebanon" reported the resistance in Hama continuing as a general strike took hold in Homs, Latakiyah, and Aleppo. On 15 February, the "Voice of Lebanon" announced that 5,000 Syrian soldiers had deserted and fled to Lebanon.
By this time Syrian forces had retaken much of the city of Hama, although isolated pockets of Muslim Brotherhood militants remained in the old portion of the city. [note: the 'rebellion' had only taken place in Hama, and not Homs, Latakiyah, Aleppo or elsewhere as the Muslim Brotherhood propaganda had stated].
On 16 February, Said Hawi, the Controller General of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, in an appeal aired over Baghdad’s "Voice of Arab Syria", called for a nationwide uprising: “The Jihad in confronting the tyrant is now a duty of all those capable of carrying arms”.
The propaganda continued on 20 February when the Baghdad "Voice of Arab Syria" urged the people of Syria to unify against the regime of Hafez Assad and stated that the religious leadership of Syria (the Muslim Brotherhood) has issued a fatwa (Islamic legal decision) which forbade any true Muslim from paying taxes to the government.
On 25 February, a Brotherhood press release picked up by the Christian Science Monitor stated that a Syrian naval base near Latakiyah had been seized and two submarines captured, claiming the Islamic Front controlled the coastline from the Latakiyah north to the Turkish border. Despite the propaganda reporting, the uprising in Syria had never spread outside of Hama, although some limited [terrorist] bombings had taken place in Damascus.
The total casualties for the Hama incident probably number about 2,000. This includes an estimated 300-400 members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s elite Secret Apparatus or about one third of their total Secret Apparatus strength in Syria. The Syrian Government defeated the fundamentalist and it will probably be several years before the Muslim Brotherhood will be able to directly challenge the government again. ...[but] the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated a new sophistication in its ability to use propaganda and garner support.
Hafez Assad’s strategy continues to be based on the realization that most Syrians, regardless of their differences, do not want the Muslim Brotherhood in power. Furthermore, the Syrians are pragmatic and realize that Assad has given Syria greater stability during his rule than it has had at any other time since achieving independence in 1946.
In a 7 March 1982 speech, President Hafez Assad accused the Muslim Brotherhood of distorting Islam, killing in the name of Islam, and “posing” as Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian President said, was nothing more than criminals who “desecrated mosques” by transforming them into arms warehouses. These criminals “butchered children, women, and old people in the name of Islam.”
The Muslim Brotherhood is determined to continue its armed struggle against the government of Syria. Iraq also appears equally willing to support [anti-government] activities and will probably continue to act as the middleman for the Muslim Brotherhood ... The Syrian dissidents' modus operandi will continue to be terrorism, particularly bombings and assassinations.
~~~~
For full Intel document online:
https://syria360.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/dia-syria-muslimbrotherhoodpressureintensifies-2.pdf